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Occupy: ‘struggles for the common’ or an ‘anti-politics of dignity’? 
Reflections on Hardt and Negri and John Holloway. 
Abstract 
This article provides a critical examination of Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri’s and John Holloway’s theory of revolutionary subjectivity, and does 
so by applying their theories to the Occupy movement of 2011. Its central 
argument is that one should avoid collapsing ‘autonomist’ and ‘open’ 
Marxism, for whilst both approaches share Tronti’s (1979) insistence on 
the constituent role of class struggle, and also share an emphasis on a 
prefigurative politics which engages a non-hierarchical and highly 
participatory politics, there nevertheless remain some significant 
differences between their approaches. Ultimately, when applied to Occupy 
Movement whilst their theory isn’t entirely unproblematic, I will argue 
that Hardt and Negri’s ‘autonomist’ approach offers the stronger 
interpretation, due mainly to their revised historical materialism.  
Introduction 
Some years ago, writing in this journal Martin Spence (2010) argued that, 
because of its specific Italian heritage, the body of thought labelled 
‘autonomism’ had become ‘misleading. The reason for this lay in the 
diversity of its authors, ranging from Mario Tronti and Antonio Negri, to 
Harry Cleaver and John Holloway. We might add here the inclusion of 
others, such as Werner Bonefeld and Simon Clarke, and Massimo De 
Angelis and Nick Dyer-Witheford. For his own purposes, Spence (2010) 
replaced the category of ‘autonomism’ with that of ‘open Marxism’, 
arguing its usefulness as an ‘appropriate tag for the field as a whole’ 
(Spence 2010, p.99). In some ways this was an unusual move. After all 
as indeed Spence also noted, the more familiar tendency has been to 
subsume open Marxism under the category of autonomism. Alex Callinicos 
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(2005) for example, argued that John Holloway’s Change the World 
Without taking Power (2002) was, alongside Hardt and Negri’s Empire 
(2000), ‘one of the key texts of contemporary autonomist Marxism’ 
(Callinicos 2005, p. 17). Despite this, Callinicos did not see their 
respective approaches as ‘identical’.  
It remains odd that, on the one hand we accept the differences between 
these respective positions and yet, on the other, proceed to subsume 
them under one or another generic label. Whilst sympathetic to De 
Angelis’ (2005, p.248) claim that this debate is ‘fallacious and divisive’, I 
will nevertheless mirror the argument of Bonefeld (2003), arguing that 
the temptation to conflate autonomist with open Marxism should be 
avoided. To substantiate this argument, here I will critically reflect on the 
theory of revolutionary subjectivity in Hardt and Negri and John Holloway, 
and do so by applying their theory to the Occupy Movement1 of 2011. For 
many commentators both of these theories can be charged with either 
vagueness, abstraction or excessive theoreticism, and this problematizes 
their more practical and concrete implementations (Harvey 2010, p.212;; 
Bieler and Morton 2003, p. 475; Callinicos 2005, p.18; Susen 2012, 
p.292, 302). Yet, as I will show, in the case of Occupy there is a clear 
opportunity to placate such critics, and as such also demonstrate that 
whilst each theory shares some underlying commonalities, there remain 
important differences as to how useful their theories are for 
understanding this movement. Given the proliferation of oppositional 
struggles in the last few years, alongside their popularity amongst the 
current generation of actors involved an appreciation of what Hardt and 
Negri’s and Holloway’s theory has to offer in this respect is particularly 
timely. 
In the first part of this article I contextualise each theory in relation to 
earlier works, and then outline the nature to each theory. Here it should 
become clear that, whilst both theories argue that revolutionary 
                                           
1 From here on in, Occupy. 
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subjectivity is one that both refuses and transcends capitalist social 
relations, in theoretical terms there are clear differences of emphasis on 
how they articulate such a practice. In the second part of the article I 
show how such theoretical differences translated into the more practical 
task of interpreting Occupy’s struggle, both in tactical and strategic 
matters. In short, whilst I will argue that Holloway’s emphasis on the 
diversity and banality of Occupy’s scream was important, and so too was 
his more dialectical approach apt for providing a more measured 
understanding of both the nature of Occupy’s ‘crack’ and indeed the 
subjectivity that opened it, it is his approach that falls short in a number 
of ways. Occupy’s innovative use of the assembly corresponded closely to 
how both Hardt and Negri and Holloway envisage the construction of 
revolutionary subjectivity, but the latter’s explicit emphasis on situating 
this struggle in relation to transformations in forms of production adds 
further substance to this claim, particularly with respect to its use of new 
social technologies and wider possibilities of institutionalising its struggle. 
Operaismo and form-analysis 
Hardt and Negri’s theory of revolutionary subjectivity must be understood 
in the context of Negri’s earlier work on the issue, particularly via his 
involvement in the Operaismo current of Italian Marxist theory in the 
1960s, and his later development of his theory throughout the 1970s. 
Following Tronti’s (1979, p.1) insistence that labour insubordination 
drives capitalist development one of the most important conceptual 
developments during this period was that of ‘class composition’ – the idea 
that specific forms of worker subjectivity must be informed by an analysis 
of both its technical and political characteristics. Whereas in technical or 
objective terms this subjectivity is structured by the form of its labour, in 
political terms its subjectivity is characterised by its needs, consciousness, 
and the organisational form of its struggle (Negri 2005; Cleaver 1992). 
Negri developed the theory of ‘self-valorization’ as a means of 
concretising this dynamic, theorising revolutionary subjectivity not only as 
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the refusal of capitalist command but also its inventive capacity for 
furthering this struggle in new and innovative ways. Thus, whereas its 
‘negative’ measure was based on the ‘spaces’ opened via the refusal of 
work, its ‘positive’ measure was determined by the extent to which such 
spaces were ‘filled, occupied’, [and] attached’ (Negri 2005, p.260). For 
Negri, self-valorization constitutes a completely different form of social 
wealth: the valorisation of human needs premised on advancements in 
the composition of social labour (ibid, p.184; cf. Harrison 2011, p.35). 
Holloway’s theory of revolutionary subjectivity would also emerge through 
earlier works, particularly his engagement with debates concerning the 
nature of the capitalist state (Holloway and Picciotto 1978). Holloway 
emphasised the importance of understanding the form and content of the 
capitalist state in direct relation to the form and content of class struggle 
(ibid, p. 30; Clarke 1991, pp. 9-18). Here as Bonefeld et al (1992) 
explain, the concept of ‘form’ assumes a specific character in the sense 
that an object’s mode of existence ‘exists only in and through the form(s) 
it takes (Bonefeld, Gunn and Psychopedis 1992, p.xv; Holloway 1995a, 
p.166). Understanding the notion of form in this way is crucial, not simply 
for unearthing an object’s hidden content but more importantly its very 
constitution. In terms of the relationship between capital and labour, 
capital can thus only exist in and through the form of alienated labour; a 
process which, crucially, cannot be isolated from class struggle – 
understood as a social relation, capital is class struggle (Holloway 
1991a).From this perspective all of Marx’s major categories – including 
value, labour, class, etc. - must be opened, understood as ‘aids to 
understanding historical processes’, articulating ‘an open world’ based on 
‘categories which conceptualise the openness of society’ (Holloway 1991b, 
p. 233; Holloway 1993, p. 76, 82; Holloway 1991c, p.71; Holloway and 
Susen 2013, p. 31). 
Multitude, exodus and the common 
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In Negri’s co-authored work (Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004, 2009) his 
theory of self-valorization remains central, although reconfigured on the 
basis of changes in class composition. In technical terms Hardt and Negri 
argue that capitalist production is predominantly ‘biopolitical’ because it 
involves not just the production of the ‘means of life’ but ‘social life itself’ 
(ibid, p. 146; Hardt and Negri 2009, p. 299). More specifically, much 
labour today is ‘immaterial’ in the sense that it encompasses ‘ideas, 
symbols, images, languages or codes, to its more ‘affective’ dimensions 
such as the generation of ease, well-being, satisfaction or excitement 
(ibid, p. 108; Hardt and Negri 2009, p. 382). The new social subject of 
biopolitical production is the multitude, understood in at least two senses. 
Firstly, in sociological and political terms the multitude is defined by the 
form of its productive activity, and whilst it remains a class concept due 
to the depth of capitalist subsumption it is much more inclusive than the 
working class (Hardt and Negri 2004, p.106). In a second, more 
philosophical sense the multitude refers to a continual disruptive 
presence, one which has always ‘refused authority and command, 
expressed the irreducible difference of singularity, and sought freedom in 
innumerable revolts and revolutions’ (Ibid, p. 221).  
For Hardt and Negri the technical changes in class composition offer 
possibilities for the multitude’s future political re-composition, and once 
again here the theory of self-valorization returns to the fore, particularly 
for rethinking the nature of social (or common)wealth. Whilst Hardt and 
Negri accept that immaterial labour remains as exploited as its industrial 
predecessor, they claim that the former has the potential for a radical 
autonomy; one which can dispense with the need for centralised oversight 
and, more importantly, continually ‘exceeds the bounds set in its 
employment by capital’ (Hardt and Negri 2004, p.147; Hardt and Negri 
2009, p.140). Hence, for Hardt and Negri immaterial labour is 
characterised by a productive excess beyond what capital can successfully 
subsume, and the reason for this is because its capacities ‘exceed work 
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and spill over into life’, and simply, capital ‘can never capture’ all of it 
(Hardt and Negri 2009, p. 151, 152; Hardt and Negri 2004, p. 146). 
In the technical sense the excessive nature of immaterial labour is pooled 
into what Hardt and Negri call ‘the common’, defined in both natural and 
cultural terms: ‘not only the earth we share but also the languages we 
create, the social practices we establish, [and] the modes of sociality that 
define our relationships’ (Hardt and Negri 2009, p. 139). From the 
common a new immanently revolutionary subjectivity can thus emerge, 
yet as established earlier, objective conditions alone do not ensure this 
process. In other words, whilst in this context the ‘negative’ measure of 
self-valorization refers to ‘resisting capitalist command and attacking the 
bases of capitalist power’, its ‘positive’ measure is developed through the 
multitude’s capacity for ‘exodus’: throwing off capital’s ‘corruptive’ 
influence, exploring the multitude’s singular differences and, ultimately, 
creating institutions adequate to political and economic self-rule (ibid, 
p.153; Hardt and Negri 2004, p.341; Hardt and Negri 200, p.212). 
Scream, power, dignity 
The starting point to Holloway’s theory is what he calls ‘the scream’: a 
multi-faceted ‘No!’ to the many forms of injustice characteristic of the 
capital relation. Whilst initially a scream of rage (or perhaps indignation) 
there is also an element of ‘hope’: a hope of a better world, thus 
articulating a ‘tension between that which exists and that which might 
conceivably exist’ (Holloway 2002a, p. 6). Ultimately it this tension which 
the scream seeks to break, and in so doing create a ‘crack’ in capitalist 
social relations. Here, as Tischler (2012, p.268) correctly emphasises the 
most important aspect of Holloway’s scream is its ordinary and, in most 
cases quite unspectacular nature. The importance of this aspect of 
Holloway’s theory is crucial for differentiating his approach from Hardt 
and Negri’s, but I will discuss this in more detail below. 
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According to Holloway (2002a) the reason why we scream is because 
capitalism negates our capacity for ‘doing’ – the ‘capacity-to-do’. Here 
Holloway opens the concept of ‘power’, in the sense that whilst ‘doing’ 
implies ‘power-to’ the reason why we scream is because capitalism 
negates this capacity and transforms it into its opposite – ‘power-over’: 
involving not the assertion of, but destruction of subjectivity (Holloway 
2002a, p.28-29). Here the sociality of human doing is broken, 
subordinated to one particular private and individualised form: labour. 
Adopting the form analysis discussed earlier, for Holloway the relationship 
between power-to and power-over must be considered an internal one: 
power-to exists in the form of power-over, but this existence is a 
contested one. Here Holloway opens the concept of ‘fetishism’ to remind 
us that the apparent ubiquity of capitalist command is undermined by its 
underlying constitution – class struggle. Due to the ordinary nature of the 
scream, however, this struggle is by no means confined to either class-
conscious activists or indeed enlightened intellectuals: ‘fetishisation’ 
emphasises the subjectivity of the ‘we, as ordinary people’ (ibid, p.89) 2. 
For Holloway the material basis for ‘hope’ lies in the underlying 
dependence of power-over on power-to; the fact that, whilst capital’s 
domination is real there always remains a ‘residue’ of subjectivity that 
cannot be completely subsumed (ibid, p.36,40, 76). From the Zapatistas 
(Subcommandante Marcuse 2001, p.41) here Holloway (1998) extracts 
the concept of ‘dignity’, which he uses to denote such a residue’s 
substance. More specifically, the concept of dignity refers to the fact that 
human beings have the inherent capacity not only to reproduce reality but 
also to negate it (Holloway 2002a, p.25).3 For Holloway ‘dignity’ refers not 
only to human subjectivity in general but also revolutionary subjectivity in 
                                           
2For an interesting disagreement within ‘open Marxism’ on this point, see Clarke (2002), and 
Holloway (2002b). 
3 By emphasising ‘doing’ as opposed to ‘being’, Holloway claims not to ontologise this struggle: 
whilst it is only on the basis of being human that humans can scream, we scream not simply 
because we are human but because we find ourseves in particular situations which deny our 
humanity (ibid; Holloway 2010, p. 43). Some have claimed that open Marxism nevertheless does 
operate with a form of ontological determinism (see Roberts 2002; Bruff 2009; Susen 2009). 
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particular: the greater the dignity behind the scream the greater the 
potential crack in capitalism (Holloway 2010, p.17). As with Hardt and 
Negri’s theory, however, the crack opened by a dignified scream must 
develop itself into something positive, an alternative form of ‘doing’ 
which, however banal, directly negates the transformation of doing into 
labour. Revolutionary subjectivity thus combines the ‘refuse-and-create’, 
forming the basis to what Holloway calls an ‘anti-politics of dignity’ (ibid, 
p.39). 
What this ‘anti-politics’ entails I will discuss below. Whilst not aiming to 
provide a comprehensive case study, here I will use Occupy as a means 
of discussing both the commonalities and differences between both Hardt 
and Negri and Holloway’s approaches, and ultimatley in this particular 
instance the relative strengths of the former over the latter. 
Occupy 
Despite having its precedents in movements such as the ‘Arab Spring’ and 
the Spanish ‘Indignados’, Occupy is credited by most as starting in New 
York City, with the occupation of Zuccotti park in September 2011 
regarded as its symbolic starting point (Constanza-Chock 2012, p.376; 
Kavada 2015, p.1)). In the space of just a few weeks similar forms of this 
struggle emerged worldwide, and whilst all of such encampments were 
gradually dispersed, there can be no doubt that, in recent times, this 
movement represented a key moment in anti-capitalist struggle. Occupy 
was composed of a range of actors and concerns, yet its most significant 
shared characteristics were the occupation of contested ‘spaces’, an 
emphasis on non-hierarchical forms of organisation and with that a highly 
engaged form of deliberative democracy. Contextually, since the 2008 
Financial Crisis much attention had been drawn to the vast inequalities 
generated by neo-liberalism, and also the responses by many 
governments to that crisis – the bailout of the banks and the ensuing 
austerity measures in particular. For Pinkerill and Krinsky (2012, p.279) 
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Occupy thus ‘triggered a moment of clarity of the absurdity of the current 
economic and political system’, and more broadly for Connolly (2011) a 
‘delayed reaction to the political economy of inequality, crisis, military 
adventurism, and corporate authoritarianism of the last 30 years’. 
There are many reasons why Occupy can be said to have been significant, 
both in terms of the movement’s successes and failures (Pickerill and 
Krinsky 2012; Ostroy 2012). In their respective reflections on Occupy, 
both Hardt and Negri (2012) and Holloway (2012) claimed that this 
movement reflected something of their own theories, for according to 
them this struggle represented not only a refusal of capitalist forms but 
an attempt to prefigure social relations beyond them. Here I will 
concentrate on a range of issues that relate most closely to each of their 
respective theories: its composition, organisational form and use of new 
forms of communicative media, and finally the question of 
institutionalisation.  
Composition 
According to Gitlin (2013) the composition of Occupy (specifically, in the 
case here Occupy Wall Street) consisted of both ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ layers, 
the former of which included a ‘radical core, roughly anarchist, veterans 
of left-wing campaigns running back to the anti-globalization movement 
of 1999, or even earlier…’, and the latter ‘…middle class people, union 
members, progressives of various stripes – not so photogenic, not outré, 
though far more numerous’ (Gitlin 2013,  p.9, 21). Others such as Min 
(2015, p.78) added additional layers, such as ‘college students, men and 
women in suits, grandmas and grandpas, veterans, homeless people, 
tourists and shoppers, all of whom were diverse in terms of ethnic 
backgrounds and political attitudes’. Such diversity in terms of the sheer 
range of Occupy’s ‘Nos!’ is something that resonates strongly with 
Holloway’s theory, and links closely to his emphasis on rethinking what 
constitutes class struggle and social antagonism. As discussed earlier, 
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class struggle must be conceptualised not merely in terms of the struggle 
of ‘labour against capital’, but also in terms of a more generic ‘doing 
against labour’ (Holloway 2002a, p.144). In this sense, Holloway’s ‘critical 
revolutionary subject’ (what he calls ‘we’) corresponds closely with the 
banality and diversity of Occupy’s scream, the ‘scream of all, with 
different degrees of intensity’ (ibid, p.150; Holloway 2010, p.219). 
For Hardt and Negri the composition of Occupy is broadened to include 
the wider struggles which, according to them should be constitutive of its 
wider ‘cycle’. In their Declaration (2012) for example, Hardt and Negri 
draw attention to four subjective figures, all of which must be considered 
in the context of both the successes and failures of neoliberalism and 
wider modifications in capitalist production in general (Hardt and Negri 
2012, p.9). Here Hardt and Negri discuss ‘the new figure of the poor’, 
comprising both waged and unwaged precarious workers all shackled by 
the ‘chains of debt’ (‘the indebted’); immaterial labours whose use of 
communication and social media both liberates yet ensnares them (‘the 
mediatized’); those whose existence is constituted by the perception of 
both internal and external threats (‘the securitized’); and finally, bringing 
all of such figures together, ‘the represented’: those which by virtue of 
the increasingly defunct nature of representative politics ‘have no access 
to effective political action’ (ibid, p.29). So typical of Hardt and Negri’s 
theory, however, is their belief that such relative powerlessness is entirely 
reversible, and this was precisely what Occupy and its precedents sought 
to do. 
In both Holloway’s and Hardt and Negri’s theory, then, there is a strong 
link to Occupy with respect to their shared emphases on the diversity of 
its composition. Yet there is an important difference between their 
approaches to this issue, and this lies principally in the way Hardt and 
Negri situate this composition. For them, such diversity is a key 
characteristic of contemporary forms of capitalist production, and because 
of this their emphasis on understanding Occupy’s struggle is framed 
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repeatedly in terms of it being, ultimately, a workers’ struggle ‘grounded 
in the new nature of labour power’ (ibid, p.60). In the final passages of 
Declaration, furthermore, mirroring their previous emphasis on the 
‘militant’ in Empire (2000, p. 412), Hardt and Negri interpret this struggle 
in terms of what they call the figure of ‘the commoner’ (ibid, p.104). 
Reiterating my point above, for Hardt and Negri the commoner is 
distinctive in terms of how it works and what it produces. As they explain, 
‘Just as a baker bakes, a weaver weaves, and a miller mills, so, too, a 
commoner ‘commons’, that is, makes the common’ (ibid, p. 105). To be 
clear, like Marx, Hardt and Negri continue to define revolutionary 
subjectivity through the prism of productive labour (Hardt and Negri 
2004, p.350), and the specificity of its struggle is one characterised by its 
attempt to rid itself of capital’s parasitic and corruptive influence that 
continually acts to ‘fetter’ the productivity of its labour (Hardt and Negri 
2000, p.361; Hardt and Negri 2009, p.148).  
There are both benefits and drawbacks to theorising Occupy in this 
manner, and I will return to the former below. The main drawback lies in 
the relative exclusivity it accords to Occupy’s struggle, emphasising in 
Holloway’s terms not so much ‘doing against labour’ but rather ‘labour 
against capital’. No doubt, this emphasis might indeed be important, but 
it misses the many quite ordinary people that took part – those, for 
example, who might have joined an occupation just for a day, or perhaps 
even just an hour; those who despite displaying only a limited degree of 
solidarity were never quite the same since. My claim here is that the open 
Marxist approach in this instance is more responsive to this phenomena, 
and this proves important especially given that it was the participation 
and support of this strata that allowed the initial spark generated by the 
core ‘inner’ activists to gain momentum (Gitlin 2013, p.6). In theoretical 
terms, alongside its ‘clumsy and obscure nature’ this is precisely how 
Holloway critiques Negri’s earlier notion of ‘self-valorization: ‘it becomes 
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something special, rather than the routine experience of everyday doing-
in-against-and-beyond labour’ (Holloway 2010, p.190). 
Organisational form 
Echoing the open Marxism of Holloway, Occupy’s composition included not 
only the self-valorizing struggles of its inner militant core, but included 
also its more confused and self-contradictory outer counterparts. Put 
differently, whilst Occupy was driven by a generalised sense of 
indignation, this indignation was as much one of the ‘indignities…suffered 
in daily life’ as it was relating to issues more specifically orientated to 
more conventional (workers’) concerns (Calhoun 2013, p. 28). From this 
lay the necessity of linking such indignities together, and indeed the 
extent to which Occupy managed to do this. In contrast to the party 
models of the past which emphasised the necessity of leaders, 
representation and programmatic strategy, one of the most distinctive 
aspects of Occupy was its emphasis on the opposite: a ‘leaderless’ 
movement that emphasised direct and highly participatory forms of 
engagement which, perhaps most distinctively, refused to formulate a set 
of specific demands. Debates within the Left concerning centralisation and 
decentralisation are nothing new, (Bailey 2012, p.139), yet distinctive of 
Occupy was the techniques it used as a means of affirming their emphasis 
on the latter. Here as Gitlin (2012, p. 11) puts it nicely, Occupy combined 
an ‘eighteenth century constitutional principle enshrining the value of 
public assembly with twenty-first century methods (social media, text 
messages, and the like) for summoning such assembly’.  
The use of the assembly was premised primarily on the occupation of 
particular spaces; symbolic by the fact that, in many cases, the spaces 
occupied were deemed ‘private’ (Calhoun 2012, p.29; Pinkerill and 
Krinsky 2012, p. 280). This in itself chimes well in both Hardt and Negri’s 
and Holloway’s theory (i.e. the fight of ‘the commoner’ for access to the 
common; occupying a crack within capital and ‘pushing back the rule of 
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money’), yet so too in a more significant sense does the functioning of the 
assembly itself for the construction of revolutionary subjectivity, 
something which, for different reasons, both theories accept must use 
different methods from the past (Hardt and Negri 2000, p.413; Hardt and 
Negri 2004, p.222; Hardt and Negri 2009, p. 352; Holloway 2002, pp. 
129-131; Bonefeld 2002). 
According to Hardt and Negri the constitution of the multitude must 
involve what they call a ‘singularity politics’, one that whilst initially 
begins as a politics of ‘identity’ nevertheless dissolves itself as a means of 
forging a wider ‘common’ subjectivity. In other words, whilst composed of 
a series of ‘irreducible multiplicities’, with each of its singularities 
relatively particularistic to each other, a singularity politics is one that 
seeks to find some form of commonality – but not ‘unity’ – amongst 
them. This is what Hardt and Negri call ‘revolutionary parallelisms’: a 
process which they compare to a kind of conductor-less orchestra, 
affirming the multitude’s constituent power without transforming it into a 
form of constituted power (Hardt and Negri 2009, p.173, 343). Although 
couched in ‘identiarian’ terms, through Min’s (2015) insights it appears 
that such a singularity politics corresponded closely to Occupy’s use of the 
assembly, albeit with a form of moderation which could be considered a 
kind of ‘conductor’. For example, through the human microphone - 
whereby due to authorities banning the use of electronic speakers or 
microphones any speech (etc.) to large audiences had to be relayed 
through crowds – there emerged a ‘viable way to construct and negotiate 
multiple identities’. Indeed, as Min (2012, p.78) continues, in some ways 
the most interesting aspect was the dialectic within this process: even if 
you disagreed with what was being relayed, you had yourself to relay it, 
thus making both yourself and others ‘more reflexive’ through forcing not 
only an assessment of your own identity but also the identities of others. 
The same process emerged through the concurrent use of hand gestures, 
although arguably in this case they served an additional purpose for the 
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moderators to judge the extent to which consensus over particular 
proposals (etc.) was emerging (ibid, p.79). 
In Holloway’s (2010, p.40) theory the use of the assembly through the 
examples above also corresponded closely for whilst he accepts the 
absolute necessity of organisation for giving oppositional cracks 
coherence, mirroring Hardt and Negri he insists that its form must be as 
‘open and receptive as possible’, one based not so much on 
‘consciousness’ but ‘sensitivity’, a ‘politics not of talking but of 
listening…of dialogue rather than monologue (Holloway 2010, p.77). In 
addition to this Holloway also rejects a specifically identity politics, adding 
that particular cracks will not become universal if the subjectivities 
creating them simply assume the ‘character mask’ (i.e. identity) that 
capital accords them. Revolutionary subjectivity, by contrast, involves a 
shedding of the mask, affirming the gap between the latter and the 
(dis)figured face behind it (ibid, p.213). Yet this latter point, I think, 
reveals an important difference between Holloway’s and Hardt and Negri’s 
accounts, and this relates back to a more theoretical disagreement 
between open and autonomist Marxism; namely, the relationship between 
structure and struggle. 
In one of his earliest reviews of Negri’s translated work, Holloway (1989, 
p.189) celebrated the Trontian re-reading of Marx arguing that, whilst at 
times it led to ‘oversimplifications and to unrealistic optimism’, the 
centrality it accorded class struggle was in principle correct – a view 
which, albeit with some qualifications, he continues to maintain today 
(Holloway 2002a, p. 163; Holloway 2009, p.95). To some extent, then, 
because of their shared emphasis on the dependence of capital on labour 
(or in Holloway’s work ‘labour on doing’), and also their shared willingness 
to theorise the latter’s potential for revolutionary autonomy, this is 
precisely why it makes sense labelling both approaches as ‘autonomist’. 
Yet there is an important difference of emphasis here, one that emerged 
within the CSE in the early ‘90s and reveals the fundamental point of 
Page 15 of 28 
 
contention between the ‘autonomist’ perspective epitomised by Negri, and 
the ‘open Marxism’ characteristic of Holloway, although in this instance 
advanced by Werner Bonefeld (2003) 4. For Bonefeld, whilst autonomism 
rightly put class struggle at the heart of its understanding of capitalist 
development, it did this whilst losing sight of the internal relationship 
between labour and capital. The main problem here – epitomised by 
Negri’s theory of self-valorization – was the idea that, within capitalist 
society, there are (un-alienated) ‘spaces’ whereby revolutionary 
subjectivity can emerge. ‘In sum,’ Bonefeld argued, ‘the internal relation 
between capital and labour is transformed into a relation of mere 
opposition, thus reducing the internal relation between form and 
materiality to a simple juxtaposition of opposition’ (Bonefeld 2003, p. 79) 
5. Holloway (2002a) mirrors Bonefeld’s point closely, characterising Hardt 
and Negri’s approach as a ‘weak’ affirmation of the ‘autonomist impulse’ – 
i.e. seeing the working class as positively autonomous, as opposed to a 
‘strong’ affirmation – i.e. seeing the working class as potentially 
autonomous (Holloway 2002a, p. 165, 174; Holloway 2009)6.  
In theoretical terms this quarrel over the (continued) relevance of 
dialectical thinking lies at the heart of the Marxism/post-Marxism debates 
of the 1970s and beyond (Harrison 2014), and both Hardt and Negri and 
Holloway have made clear their respective allegiances (see Casarino and 
Negri 2008, p. 46, 122, 167; Holloway 2009). My focus here is more 
practical, however, for one could argue that this has as a significant 
influence on the interpretation of what Occupy represented. There are two 
                                           
4 This essay was originally published in Issue 13 of Common Sense, 1994. 
5 In his unpublished response, Harry Cleaver (1993) – author of Reading Capital Politically and 
another prominent autonomist Marxist – argued that Bonefeld’s reading of this theory was 
misplaced. More specifically, Cleaver argued that the theory of self-valorization articulates both 
‘momentary ruptures and…how they can develop into more decisive and definitive ruptures’ (p. 8). 
In contrast, he continues, the problem with Bonefeld’s own approach to the issue lies in his 
retention of the dialectic. This ‘presupposition of his is precisely what forecloses any theory of 
alterneity, of transcendence’ (ibid, original emphasis). Reiterating Negri’s own thoughts on the 
issue, Cleaver concludes the dialectic is really only functional to capital in that it ‘denotes the 
dynamics of class struggle within capitalism’, and not, as in the case of the theory of self-
valorization theorise a way of breaking it (p.11; see also Cleaver 1984). 
6 Despite the validity of this point, some have claimed that even Holloway’s more dialectical 
understanding of power – or doing - remains overly simplistic (De Angelis 2005; Young and 
Schwartz 2012, p.226; McNaughton 2009, p. 16). 
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issues here, both of which relate to Hardt and Negri’s retention of a more 
typically inspired Marxian historical narrative. Whilst rejecting the idea 
that history is pre-ordained, secured by a pending synthetic closure of the 
political (Negri 2008, p.41; Hardt and Negri 2009, p.378), Hardt and 
Negri’s project tends to posit a rather unmediated relation between the 
respective social forces driving it (labour and capital/constituent and 
constituted power, etc.). In other words, Occupy’s struggle was more one 
that sought to guard against the corruption of the common rather than 
one that sought to un-corrupt the common itself. In addition to this, 
however, in their account there remains a sense that even if Occupy’s 
struggles fizzled out, it would inevitably recompose itself at a later date 
(Hardt and Negri 2012, p.69, p.102). Thus, for them perhaps the best 
way of situating Occupy was not so much what it represented then, but 
what it might represent for the future: whilst prefigurative politics is 
important, it ultimately depends on an ‘event’ that remains relatively 
unforeseen (ibid, p.102). 
To some extent, any position that emphasises the dependence of the 
powerful on the powerless is optimistic – Holloway’s included (Thompson 
2005; Aufheben 2003). Yet, with his retention of dialectics – albeit a 
‘negative’ form which also denies the more deterministic aspects 
associated with Marx’s – Holloway’s approach is arguably more able to 
avoid the excesses outlined above. Although Hardt and Negri might 
concur with the idea that any ‘crack’ is inherently experimental, there is 
an added emphasis in Holloway’s theory that undermines the optimism 
with which they might be charged, and in many senses at this point we 
are redirected to the theoretical debate within the CSE discussed above: 
the extent to which any oppositional ‘space’ can be said to be truly 
autonomous. For Holloway, then, Occupy’s crack was always already 
infected by the sort of society which it brought into question: ‘…our cracks 
are not pure cracks’ (Holloway 2010, p.64). Through this account not only 
is the crack itself problematized, but yet to too is the subjectivity that 
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opened it. In direct contrast the more prophetic and messianistic 
tendencies of Hardt and Negri’s ‘multitude’, for Holloway there is no pure 
revolutionary subject either in terms of abstract notions of ‘humanity’, 
revolutionary activists or even intellectuals. In other words, the ‘character 
masks’ assumed in capitalist society do not conceal an untainted 
subjectivity, but rather one that is ‘disfigured’ by the mask itself (ibid, 
p.216, 222). On top of this, finally, is Holloway’s outright rejection of 
Hardt and Negri’s appeals to the future, an emphasis that chimed 
particularly well with Occupy’s ‘inner’ core’s resistance to formulating a 
representative politics of ‘demands’ (Gitlin 2013, p.8). As Holloway put it 
in Crack Capitalism, ‘The validity of a rupture does not depend on the 
future…We ask no permission of anyone and we do not wait for the 
future, but simply break time and assert now another type of doing, 
another form of social relations’ (Holloway 2010, p.73, 241).  
On this score Holloway’s theory is more attune to the barriers to Occupy’s 
struggle, and whilst certainly praiseworthy of it he ultimately offered a 
more guarded and realistic account of its open and uncertain nature. Yet 
from another point of view, whilst one might accept both the diversity and 
banality of its many ‘Nos!’, and at times also their contradictory and 
confused nature, perhaps the absence of the more conventional Marxian 
narrative found in Hardt and Negri’s theory adds a layer to understanding 
Occupy that Holloway’s theory could not. Here I refer to the fact that 
missing in Holloway’s theory – perhaps because of his emphasis on ‘doing’ 
instead of ‘labour’ – is what changing forms of productive activity offered 
in terms of the tools for adding substance to Occupy’s struggle. Put 
differently, in sharp contrast to the autonomist Marxism of Hardt and 
Negri here we can reiterate the practical implications of a more theoretical 
point made previously by others, namely, open Marxism’s reluctance to 
theorise forms of labour (c.f. De Angelis 1995; Neary 2004). 
Linking back to Occupy a useful example here was its use of social media, 
particularly its ‘instrumental role in the quick diffusion of the movement 
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and the mobilization of participants’ (Kavanda 2015, p.2). In terms of 
getting initial publicity, Constanza-Chock (2012, p.376) points out how 
excessive policing was circulated first through social media, and whilst its 
use isn’t something specific to Occupy there can be no doubt that it 
formed a major aspect of the movement on a whole.  As Pickerill and 
Krinsky (2012, p.284) explain, Occupy employed ‘a range of online 
forums, social networks and open-source software and practices. 
Facebook, Blogs and Twitter were extensively used and many Occupy 
camps were extremely media savvy’. Such use of new forms of 
communications was not lost on Hardt and Negri, for as I indicated above, 
their theory accounts for it well.  For them its use must be linked directly 
to the growing hegemony of immaterial labour, particularly the ever-
growing importance of knowledge and communication. Linking back to the 
discussion of organisational form above, the ‘horizontal’ and network-
based nature of such technology corresponded directly with the needs of 
a singularity politics (Hardt and Negri 2012, p.38), and in a sense, what 
Occupy did was simply use the tools of its labour to challenge the system 
to which it puts them to use. Put slightly differently, the technical basis to 
the multitude’s composition offers insights as to the possibility and nature 
of its emergent political composition.  
There is no inherent reason why Holloway’s theory wouldn’t also 
emphasise the promise of new forms of communication, although because 
of his overarching emphasis on ‘doing against labour’, in sharp contrast to 
Hardt and Negri this emphasis is lacking. Despite this there are important 
limitations to the potentials of such technology, two of which are worth 
raising. Firstly, there is the issue of precisely what sort of solidarity 
Occupy’s use of social media permitted, particularly its highly 
individualized and somewhat fleeting nature. In other words, it is one 
thing using new technologies to help mobilise social movements, and this 
can be particularly useful for bypassing ‘official’ media outlets which are 
either outright hostile or unwilling to report them. It is another, however, 
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to assume that ‘liking’ a Facebook page will lead to any lasting and/or 
coherent form of collective solidarity. In this sense Occupy’s use of social 
media created a distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ forms of solidarity, 
and whilst the support of the latter was useful for those on the ground, it 
nevertheless ‘relegated the people participating online to spectators’ 
(Kavanda 2012, p.9). A second problematic aspect of Occupy’s use of 
social media concerns the extent to which it overcame existing 
inequalities amongst those that used them. Here there remained issues 
relating to both access and knowledge that reproduced existing 
inequalities relating to race, class and gender (Harigittai 2008). These 
issues certainly weren’t overcome by Occupy, perhaps because of its 
more exclusive emphasis on inequalities pertaining to wealth (Pinkerill 
and Krinsky 2012, p. 282; Calhoun 2013, p.34). Also, given Occupy’s 
‘extreme openness’ and its leaderless pretences the organisation and 
management of social media didn’t always chime with such values. Here, 
not only was the necessity (and usefulness) of previous activist 
experience important, but the structure of social media platforms 
themselves ‘meant that the administrators…had a significant role in 
shaping the collective voice’ (Kavanda 2015, p.11; Constanza-Chock 
2012, p.380).   
Institutionalisation 
One final aspect of both Hardt and Negri’s and Holloway’s theories in 
relation to Occupy concerns the extent to which revolutionary subjectivity 
should engage with the state, for as stated earlier one of Occupy’s most 
distinctive themes was its rejection of conventional representative politics. 
For Gitlin (2013) this emphasis chimed more with its ‘inner’ as opposed to 
‘outer’ elements, yet here we find an additional divergence between our 
two respective theories. For example, despite accepting that revolutionary 
(anti-state) movements usually ‘intertwine’ with their counterpart, as a 
moment in the separation of subject and object Holloway argues that a 
specifically anti-politics of dignity must avoid it, for whilst this might 
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indeed lead to progressive reforms it nevertheless ‘involves a 
demobilisation and de-radicalisation of the original movement’ (Holloway 
2010, p.60, 61). From this perspective Occupy was right not to make 
specific demands of the state, for in theoretical terms not only is an anti-
politics of dignity one that rejects the idea of offering an alternative 
‘totality’, but even capitalism’s ‘most attractive versions…constitutes an 
attack against humanity and the conditions of human existence’ 
(Holloway 2010, p.144; Holloway 2012). 
By contrast, in Hardt and Negri’s theory there is greater scope for linking 
more long-term (revolutionary) strategic goals with more short-term 
(reformist) and tactical ones. Mirroring Holloway’s arguments above 
whilst they accept that ‘political engagement with the state…is no doubt 
useful, and yet the multitude ‘has no interest in taking control of state 
apparatuses’ the key difference between open and autonomist Marxism 
on this issue lies in the latter developing a theory of how, using Gitlin’s 
(2013) terminology, Occupy might have made the transition from being a 
mere ‘moment’ to a more organisationally coherent ‘movement’. There 
are two issues that warrant discussion here. Firstly, in terms of short-
term tactical matters Hardt and Negri concede that making demands on 
both states and global institutions is indeed warranted, and this includes 
three in particular: the provision of the ‘basic means of life’, a form of 
‘global citizenship’ and ‘open access to the common’ (Hardt and Negri 
2009, p.380, 381). For more long-term and strategic matters Hardt and 
Negri emphasise the potential of a revised form of federalism, which 
again, emphasises the necessity of understanding its future potential in 
relation to what already exists, accepting that the existing order does at 
least register ‘the overflowing and unmeasurable forms of value produced 
by the multitude, and the ever greater power of the common’ (ibid, 
p.372; Hardt and Negri 2012, p.88-99). Here, then, Hardt and Negri’s 
approach goes well beyond Holloway’s in the sense that their emphasis on 
institutionalising Occupy’s struggle sought to theorise how its struggle 
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could be protected and consolidated. What follows is both a more 
concrete and pragmatic approach, one that overcomes the fact that, so 
problematic to Holloway’s theory, once the state is reduced in theoretical 
terms to a mere form of capital its historical specificity is lost and thus so 
too are the insights of how one should engage with it (McNaughton 2009, 
p.7; Bruff 2009; Foran 2012). 
Conclusion 
Through the application of Hardt and Negri’s and Holloway’s theories to 
Occupy it is clear that in some senses their emphases are very similar, 
governed as they are by a shared acceptance of Tronti’s (1979) insistence 
on the revolutionary potential of the autonomy of labour – or in 
Holloway’s revised account, ‘doing’ – from capital. For both autonomist 
and open Marxism Occupy represented a key instance of revolutionary 
subjectivity: a struggle that sought not only to reject capitalist society but 
also attempted to prefigure alternative social relations that might offer 
the basis for a form of society beyond it. In this sense, the temptation 
here is to collapse both theories under one heading, and this seems 
justified considering that -  referring specifically to Negri’s theory of self-
valorization – Holloway (2010, p.189) accepts that ‘we are speaking of, 
and trying to understand, more or less the same processes of revolt’. 
Despite this, we have seen that there are some important differences 
between their approaches, many of which stem from Hardt and Negri’s 
revised historical materialism. Given their explicit rejection of dialectics 
some might claim that categorising their thought in this manner is 
problematic, yet it seems clear that their approach retains much of 
Marx’s, particularly with respect to situating Occupy’s struggle within a 
wider historical and contextual framework. For Hardt and Negri Occupy 
wasn’t simply an abstract struggle to ‘crack’ capitalism, but took place on 
a specific terrain conditioned by new forms of capitalist production, and 
the subjective force behind its contestation were more than simply a 
generalised ‘we’.  Despite this, Holloway’s emphasis on the banality and 
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everyday nature of the scream was reflected in Occupy’s composition, and 
thus too the sheer diversity of the ‘Nos’ that constituted it. 
The most pressing issue remains the question of organisational form: 
given that Occupy lasted only a few short weeks to what extent is 
‘horizontalism’ adequate for sustaining oppositional cracks? A real 
problem here is also the strategy of occupation itself, for as Calhoun 
(2013, p.30) points out, ‘it made displacement a nearly fatal disruption’. 
The extent to which this passes judgement on Hardt and Negri’s and 
Holloway’s theories really depends on what measure you use, for in both 
theories the aim wasn’t the capture of state power but rather an attempt 
to occupy a space within capitalist society as a means of developing and 
exploring social relations that might offer a future beyond it. From this 
perspective one could argue that Occupy did what it set out to do, yet 
again, beyond Holloway’s insistence that we simply do not know what lies 
beyond this Hardt and Negri’s theory was able to provide more detail with 
respect to what might, depended as it is on a relatively unforeseen 
‘event’. Here in other words one could argue strongly that whilst 
Holloway’s anti-politics of dignity was more limited to theorising the 
‘moment’ of Occupy, through their emphasis on institutionalising its 
struggle Hardt and Negri’s singularity politics was able to go one step 
further, theorising at least, the movement from being ‘a moment’ to a 
‘movement’. Their prescriptions on this matter might indeed be 
speculative, adventurous and at times tainted with an excessive 
optimism, yet their emphasis on theorising the future in terms of the 
specificities of the present seems to me the more promising approach. 
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